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Building abandonment has become a critical problem in many
cities." The abandonment of a building may adversely affect nearby
residents, accelerating the decline of the neighborhood and triggering
further abandonment.2 The impact of abandonment is particularly
marked in transitional areas-aging but stable neighborhoods usually
located on the periphery of slums. 3 This Note argues that nuisance
1. The problem of abandonment has prompted considerable concern and commentary.
E.g., W. GRIGSBY & L. ROSENBURG, URBAN HOUSING POLICY (1975) [hereinafter cited as
GRICSBY]; G. STERNLIEB & R. BURCHELL, RESIDENTIAL ABANDONMENT: THE TENEMENT
LANDLORD REvIsiTED (1973) [hereinafter cited as STERNLIEB]; UNITED STATES DrPARTMIENT
OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, ABANDONED HOUSING RESEARCH: A COMPENDIUM
(1973) [hereinafter cited as HUD]; Sternlieb, Abandonment and Rehabilitation: What
is to be Done?, in Papers Submitted on Housing Production, Housing Demand, and
Developing a Suitable Living Environment, to Subcomm. on Housing Panels of the
House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 315-82 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as House Papers]; Hearings on Bills Relating to Housing and Urban Development
Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; N.Y.
Times, Apr. 12, 1976, at 1, col. 6-7. The most common measure of abandonment used in
these studies is the housing unit-a house, apartment, group of rooms, or single room
intended to be a separate living quarter. See BUREAU or THE CENSUS, CURRENT HOUSING
REPORTS: HOUSING VACANCIES 5 (Ser. H-111-75-5, Apr. 1976).
In the period between 1965 and 1968, owners in New York City alone abandoned
nearly 100,000 housing units, more than were destroyed in over 20 years of slum clear-
ance. Kristof, Housing: Economic Facets of New York City's Problems, in AGENDA FOR A
CITY: ISSUES CONFRONTING NEw YORK 305-11 (L. Fitch & A. Walsh eds. 1971). Abandon-
ment in New York City is continuing at a rate of 21,000 to 50,000 units a year. N.Y.
Times, Apr. 12, 1976, at 1, col. 6. As many as one million units, out of a housing stock
of approximately three million units, may be abandoned by the end of 1980. Note,
Building Abandonment in New York City, 16 N.Y.L.F. 798, 798-99 (1970).
In 1970, there were 10,000 abandoned housing units in St. Louis and 30,000 in
Philadelphia. HUD, supra at 5. Baltimore was losing 4,400 units annually by 1972
estimates; Chicago, about 1,800 units. Edson, Housing Abandonment-The Problem and a
Proposed Solution, 7 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 382 (1972). Washington, D.C., Boston,
Cleveland, and Houston also have abandofment problems. Senate Hearings, supra at
803-04. Even newer urban areas, such as Los Angeles, have experienced some difficulties
with abandonment. GRIGSBY, supra at 157.
In addition to eroding the urban housing stock, abandonment shrinks the property tax
base and thus drains a major source of city revenue. N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1976, at 50,
col. 1; id., Feb. 8, 1976, § 8, at 1, col. 2.
2. See note 19 infra. Abandonment occurs in sound as well as deteriorated neighbor-
hoods. See GRIGSBY, supra note 1, at 206 ("[C]oncern over abandonment arises precisely
because it appears in so many instances to precipitate rather than follow decay, striking
solid structures in physically sound neighborhoods, not just those buildings and areas
where deterioration has almost run its course." (footnote omitted)); HUD, supra note 1,
at 9, 10, 12; N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1976, at 1, col. 6. See also Nachbaur, Empty Houses:
Abandoned Residential Buildings in the Inner City, 17 How. L.J. 3 (1971).
3. It is difficult to define transitional areas more precisely. New York City's Neighbor-
hood Preservation Program, which focuses on transitional areas, uses four criteria to
designate neighborhoods for attention: (1) whether the housing stock is essentially sound
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suits against abandoning owners should be encouraged,4 and it pro-
poses means to facilitate such actions. Imposition of liability on
abandoning owners should slow the deterioration of the urban hous-
ing stock and improve the allocation of resources devoted to housing,
without regressive distributional effects.
I. Abandonment: The Problem
Buildings generally are abandoned because they no longer are
viable investments.5 Rent control" and reduced demand for urban
housing 7 keep revenues down while obsolescense, problem tenants, s
but financial institutions and property owners have begun to withdraw financing; (2)
whether the housing stock has deteriorated but needs only moderate rehabilitation; (3)
whether certain housing indicators recently have signaled an adverse trend; and (4)
whether unique neighborhood characteristics (e.g., tenant groups, parks, public trans-
portation) reinforce the stability of the area. Weitzman, Neighborhood Preservation in
New York City, 3 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 425, 432-33 (1975). New York City neighborhoods
with transitional area designations-"neighborhood preservation areas" and "'preventive
rehabilitation areas"-represented about 40% of the city's housing stock in 1965. Id. at
429 n.22.
Hughes and Bleakly have delineated five stages of neighborhood decline. J. HUGHES
& K. BLIAKLY, URBAN HoMNESTEADING 50-52 (1975). Isolated incidents of abandonment
commonly occur in Stage 2 and Stage 3 neighborhoods, "areas where the level of urban
degeneration has not gone [very] far and where there are significant pockets of deeply-
rooted citizenry who can serve as an anchor for the maintenance of whole neighbor-
hoods." Id. at 55.
4. In only one reported case was an abandoning owner held liable in nuisance for the
decline in a neighbor's property value. Puritan Holding Co. v. Holloschitz, 82 Misc. 2d
905, 372 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Sup. Ct. 1975). The plaintiff owned a recently renovated apart-
ment building in an urban renewal area where property values were rising. When a
building across the street was abandoned, the value of the plaintiff's apartment building
dropped approximately S30,000. Id. at 907, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 502. The court, recognizing
the power of a single abandoned building to destroy a neighborhood, found the building
a nuisance and rendered a default judgment for the plaintiff. Id., 372 N.Y.S.2d at 502.
See N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1975, at 45, col. 1.
5. Not all owners are motivated by economic considerations. Resident owners are less
likely to capitulate to the economic pressures that normally cause abandonment.
Sternlieb's study of Newark found that 46.3% of non-abandoning owners resided in
their buildings, whereas only 11.9% of abandoning owners had lived in the buildings
that they abandoned. STERNLIEB, supra note I, at 306.
6. Nrw YORK CITY RAND INSTITUTE, RENTAL HOUSING IN NEW YORK CITY: CONFRONTING
1HL CRISIS (I. Lowry ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as RAND STUDY]; Senate Hearings, supra
note 1, at 805-06.
7. This reduced demand results from a long term trend toward urban decentralization
.spurred by decreasing transportation costs, a general preference for suburban living, and
a steady rise in income. See GRIGSBY, supra note 1, at 197-98 (effects of preference for
suburban living and rising incomes); R. MUTH, CITIES AND HOUSING 117-21 (1969) (on
role of decreasing transportation costs). As their incomes rise, families move away from
the city leaving their former homes for occupancy by lower income families. As
poorer people move into these homes, housing demand near the center of the city
diminishes. E. MILLS, URBA.N EcONONICS 176-78 (1972).
8. See GRIGSBY, supra note 1, at 201.
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code enforcement, 9 and general economic conditions increase costs of
operation.' 0 As profitability decreases, the market values of these
buildings decline. Since ready buyers are unavailable," owners become
locked in. They lose their incentive to maintain services and under-
take necessary repairs. Finally, they abandon. 12
The abandoning owner, however, usually does not consider the costs
his actions impose on his neighbors. An abandoned building produces
various types of "negative externalities"' 3 which interfere with the
use and enjoyment of nearby property. A vacant building is a frequent
target of vandals. 14 It may shelter criminal activity and harbor
derelicts and drug addicts who threaten the security of nearby resi-
dents.l 5 In addition, an abandoned building may become a fire' and
9. Strict enforcement of housing codes may accelerate abandonment by forcing land-
lords to bear additional costs. On the other hand, when the housing codes are not
enforced, maintenance declines and abandonment eventually may follow. Compare
Nachbaur, supra note 2, at 39-43. with Freilich, Housing Code Enforcement and Abandon-
ment: An Impossible Choice for tile Courts, 7 URB. LAW. ix, xiii (1975), and Project,
Abandonment of Residential Property in an Urban Context, 23 DEPAUL L. REV. 1186,
1196 (1974). But see GRIGSBY, supra note 1, at 158 ("In only a few instances were there
any indications that abandonments of basically sound structures followed directly the
city's enforcement of the housing code.") See generally Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing
Codes and Tenant Remedies: An Integration, 56 B.U. L. REV. 1, 66-83 (1976) (examining
the impact of strict enforcement in stable and deteriorated areas).
10. For example, increases in the cost of heating oil have led directly to increased
abandonment. N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1974, § 8, at 1, col. 1; id., Feb. 26, 1974, at 1, col. 7.
11. HUD, supra note 1, at 8. Even in transitional areas, buyers are difficult to find.
See Nourse & Phares, The Impact of FHA Insurance Practices on Urban Housing Markets
in Transition-The St. Louis Case, 9 URB. L. ANN. 111, 112 (1975).
12. Abandonment may also be triggered by a sudden adverse event. Fire or vandalism,
for example, may necessitate expensive repairs. Rather than risk a large investment, the
owner may walk away. GRIGSBY, supra note 1, at 207-08. In addition, many buildings are
abandoned in anticipation of government takings by eminent domain. See id. at 157;
Note, Condemnation Blight and the Abutting Landowner, 73 MicH, L. REv. 583, 584
(1975).
13. A "negative externality" is a direct adverse effect on one person's welfare
"arising as an incidental by-product of some other person's or firm's activity." E.
MIsHAN, CosT-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 101, 109 (1971).
14. See Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655, 660 (E.D. Mich. 1966), aff'd, 405
F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968); GRIGSBY, supra note 1, at 176-78; Comment, Property Abandon-
ment in Detroit, 20 WAYNE L. REv. 845, 866 (1974). A former Chicago building commis-
sioner reportedly observed that buildings in Chicago are "fit only for the wrecking ball"
within two weeks after vacancy. Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 821.
15. Nearly 4% of major reported crimes in Newark in 1971 occurred in abandoned
buildings-10 murders, 15 rapes, and almost 150 incidents of assault and battery. In
addition, vacant buildings were the sites of nearly 200 incidents of malicious mischief
and 100 narcotics offenses. STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 150. See Senate Hearings, supra
note 1, at 890 (indicating similar situation in Boston).
16. Abandoned buildings are inherently fire-prone and present an inviting target for
arsonists. In Boston, 18% of all structural fires in 1969 occurred in vacant buildings.
Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 880. More than 21% of severe fires in Newark in 1970
and 1971 occurred in vacant residential buildings, yet less than 5% of buildings in the
city were vacant. STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at xxi-xxii. New York City recently suffered a
rash of such fires. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 8, 1975, § 4, at 5, col. I; id., May 20, 1975,
at 50, col. 1. The risk of fire is so great that the presence of one abandoned structure in
a neighborhood of clapboard buildings may lead to cancellation of insurance for the
entire block. Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 831.
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health hazard. 17 Less tangibly, it may inflict aesthetic and psycho-
logical injuries. 5 Furthermore, an abandonment in a transitional area
may create expectations of neighborhood deterioration, thereby de-
pressing real estate values and precipitating further abandonment. 10
Despite the serious damage caused by abandonment, city govern-
ments have afforded neighbors of abandoning owners little protection.
Statutory restrictions and administrative programs designed to mitigate
the harmful effects of abandonment" have been, on the whole, in-
17. J. HUGHES & K. BLEAKLY, supra note 3, at 56. An abandoned building may become
a breeding place for rats and flies. See City of Chicago v. General Realty Corp., 133 Ill.
App. 2d 662, 664, 665, 273 N.E.2d 712, 713, 714 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 945 (1972).
Furthermore, children may be hurt playing in a structurally unsafe abandoned building.
See Beauchamp v. New York City Hous. Auth., 12 N.Y.2d 400, 190 N.E.2d 412, 240
N.Y.S.2d 15 (1963); Runkel v. City of New York, 282 App. Div. 173, 123 N.Y.S.2d 485
(1953). Or an abandoned building may collapse and injure neighbors. See Marshall-
Putnam Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Shaver, 12 I1. App. 3d 402, 299 N.E.2d 10 (1973); Rapkin
v. City of New York, 139 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
18. Abandoned buildings are often eyesores. For pictures of such buildings, see
STERNLIEB, supra note I, at 50 passim, and Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 932-33, 936-38.
For a discussion of the psychological damage that may stem from abandonment, see
Note, Philadelphia's Urban Homesteading Ordinance: A Poor Beginning Toward Reoc-
cupying the Urban Ghost Town, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 735, 752 (1974).
19. A component of the value of real property is the quality of surrounding property.
Deterioration of sound housing thus stems in part from owners' fears that they will be
unable to recoup their full investments on maintenance and repairs because neighbors
will permit nearby buildings to deteriorate. Weitzman, supra note 3, at 441-42. See
Davis & Whinston, The Economics of Urban Renewal, 26 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 105,
108-10 (1961). But see E. MILLS, supra note 7, at 173-74.
The snowballing process of deterioration has been described by a former official of
New York City's Housing and Development Administration:
[We are up against a contagious self-fulfilling prophecy. That is, an owner, sensing
the beginning of a neighborhood's decline, will be loathe to rehabilitate since an
isolated renovation in a sea of "encroaching deterioration" will be both futile and
financially [disastrous]. This premature pessimism results in an area quickly snow-
balling from sound to slightly bad to deteriorating and finally to total abandon-
ment ....
... In a very real sense, abandonment signals a [community's] decline; when bad
buildings are vacated, the other owners begin to panic and good houses in the
vicinity are abandoned at the same time.
Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 807.
This process, also termed a "domino" or "contagion" effect, has been widely recognized.J. HUGHES & K. BLEAKLY, supra note 3, at 57-58. See HUD, supra note 1, at 9; Nachbaur,
supra note 2, at 10-11; Comment, supra note 14, at 856-57, 874. But see GrIGsBY, supra
note 1, at 208.
20. Many cities require the owner of an abandoned building to have it sealed or con-
tinuously guarded. E.g., L.A. Mux. CODE § 57.20.12 (1970); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § C26-80.0
(1969). See Comment, supra note 14, at 875 (Detroit). Illinois, however, has a statutory
policy against sealed buildings, An unsafe or abandoned building must be either repaired
by the owner or demolished. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-31-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976).
Cities also can demolish buildings which present health or safety hazards and take liens
on the property for the cost of demolition. E.g., id. § 11-31-1; MASS. ANN. LAws ch.
139, §§ 1-3A (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1976); N.Y. MULT. DwELL. LAW §§ 309.2, 309.4
(McKinney 1974). In' New York, if a building is a nuisance but does not require demo-
lition, the city may ask the court to place the building in receivership. Id. § 309.5. See
Note, The New York City Housing Receivership and Community Management Programs,
3 FORDHAM URu. L.J. 637 (175).
In addition, cities may cquire title to buildings for which property taxes are in
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effective.21 Nor can courts be expected to mandate enforcement of
anti-abandonment laws.22  Neighbors, therefore, must seek other
remedies.
arrears. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:5-19 (West 1960); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § D17-4.0 (Supp.
1975). New York City has a special proceeding to acquire title to multiple dwellings
which have been abandoned. N.Y. RrL PROP. AcTiONs LAW §§ 1970-1974 (McKinney
Supp. 1975) (title may be taken (a) where building is occupied, if owner has failed to
demand rent for three months and his neglect has rendered building dangerous, or (b)
where building is vacant and unsealed, if government agency has prohibited occupancy
or taxes are in arrears for at least one year). Buildings acquired by cities may be
demolished, sold, rehabilitated with public funds, or turned over to homesteaders. See
Note, Homesteading 1974: Reclaiming Abandoned Houses on the Urban Frontier, 10
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 416 (1974); Note, Low Income Co-ops: A Solution to Abandon-
ment, 17 N.Y.L.F. 148 (1971); Note, supra note 18, at 735 n.2.
21. The sealing statutes have been generally ineffective. Vandals and derelicts simply
break through the barricades, so that the building continues to cause substantial harm
to the neighborhood. Comment, supra note 14, at 875. See Senate Hearings, supra note 1,
at 829, 833-34.
Demolition has been used with some frequency, at least in Newark, see J. HuGHES &
K. BLEAKLY, supra note 3, at 218, and Detroit, Comment, supra note 14, at 869. But even
where demolition programs are carried out, a building usually will remain standing,
generating negative externalities, for 2% to eight months after a complaint is filed. Id.
Beyond these problems, there are legal limits to what such programs can accomplish.
Under the due process clause of the New York Constitution, a city cannot order demoli-
tion unless the abandoned building creates an "imminent peril to the public health"
that sealing and securing would fail to eliminate. Ozone Holding Corp. v. City of
New York, 79 Misc. 2d 744, 750, 361 N.Y.S.2d 558, 565 (Sup. Ct. 1974). Illinois cities may
not demolish a building unless the owner is given a reasonable opportunity to repair
dangerous conditions. City of Aurora v. Meyer, 38 Ill. 2d 131, 136-37, 230 N.E.2d 200,
203-04 (1967). See City of Chicago v. General Realty Corp., 133 Il1. App. 2d 662, 273
N.E.2d 712 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 945 (1972). Yet a reparable building or one
that is not an "imminent peril" may still inflict serious hardi on the community.
Moreover, since demolition programs are not directly responsive to the level of exter-
nalities generated by a building and since the owner's exposure to loss under the pro-
grams is limited to the cost of demolition discounted by the probability of enforcement,
the owner has little incentive to prevent externalities. Liability for damage would provide
a more substantial incentive. The damages assessed would be directly related to the
level of externalities generated by the building.
Receivership is ill-adapted to the problem of abandonment because it is slow and
expensive. See Note, Receivership of Problem Buildings in New York City and its
Potential for Decent Housing of the Poor, 9 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROn. 309, 34t0-48, 350
(1973). Consequently, it is rarely used. See Note, The New York City Housing Receiver-
ship and Community Management Programs, supra note 20, at 659 (in 1975, only 108
buildings in New York City were in receivership). Cities may not institute foreclosure
proceedings unless taxes have been in arrears for at least one year. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP.
LAws ANN. § 211.60 (Supp. 1976) (three years); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:5-19 (West 1970)
(one year); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § D17-40 (Supp. 1975) (three years). The results of New
York City's special streamlined proceeding to acquire title to abandoned multiple
dwellings also have been disappointing because loopholes have limited the applicability
of the new proceeding. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1974, at 42, col. 6.
The destructive effects of an abandoned building in a transitional area begin to appear
almost contemporaneously with the abandonment. See note 19 supra. Programs with
substantial lag times are thus of marginal value to residents in such areas.
22. Courts generally will not issue a writ of mandamus to a city agency acting within
its discretion. See Perazzo v. Lindsay, 30 App. Div. 2d 179, 290 N.Y.S.2d 971, aff'd, 23
N.Y.2d 764, 244 N.E.2d 471, 296 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1968). Enforcement of anti-abandonment
statutes is largely discretionary. In New York City, for example, the Housing and
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II. The Nuisance Approach
Nuisance law offers a means of dealing with the harmful externali-
ties of abandonment.2 3 The owner of an abandoned building that is a
fire, health, or safety hazard can be held liable for maintaining a public
nuisance.24 The effects of the abandonment on nearby residents may
be sufficiently different in kind from harms suffered by the general
public to give these residents a private right of action.2 5 Neighbors
who can demonstrate that the building has interfered with the use or
enjoyment of their property may also seek relief for a private
nuisance.2 6 But regardless of the theory upon which the suit is pred-
icated, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct has been
unreasonable. Reasonableness usually is determined by balancing the
gravity and probability of the harm imposed on the plaintiff against
Development Administration is responsible for deciding when an abandoned building
"is a fire hazard or in a condition dangerous or detrimental to human life, health or
morals" and should be demolished. i'.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 309.2.a (McKinney 1974).
23. For general discussions of nuisance law, see ,V. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF ToRTs §§ 88, 89 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §§ 821B-828 (Tent.
Draft No. 17, 1971) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
24. City & County of San Francisco v. Meyer, 208 Cal. App. 2d 125, 25 Cal. Rptr. 99
(1962); City of Chicago v. Birnbaum, 49 Il1. 2d 250, 274 N.E.2d 22 (1971); Beauchamp v.
New York City Hous. Auth., 12 N.Y.2d 400, 190 N.E.2d 412, 240 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1963).
An abandoning owner remains responsible for his property since abandonment does
not extinguish legal title. See Hunter v. Schultz, 240 Cal. App. 2d 24, 28, 49 Cal. Rptr.
315, 317 (1966). Puritan Holding Co. v. Holloschitz, 82 Misc. 2d 905, 372 N.Y.S.2d 500
(Sup. Ct. 1975).
25. Although public nuisance actions usually are brought by cities, private individuals
can recover if the damage they suffer is distinguishable from that suffered by the gen-
eral public. W. PRossrR, supra note 23, §§ 86, 88, at 572-73, 586. See Prosser, Private
Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 998 (1966). For example, neighbors of
abandoned buildings may suffer a decline in their property values which constitutes
special damages. "There are even cases in which a substantial depreciation in the value
of the land, apart from any other interference, has been held to be in itself sufficient
particular damage." Id. at 1019-20. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, § 821C, comment h
(pecuniary loss); Graceland Corp. v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 7 App. Div. 2d 89, 93,
180 N.Y.S.2d 644, 648 (1958), afj'd, 6 N.Y.2d 900, 160 N.E.2d 926, 190 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1959)
(plaintiff suffered special damage because of decline in rental value of his property). But
see Biber v. O'Brien, 138 Cal. App. 353, 361, 32 P.2d 425, 429 (1934).
26. Private nuisance is restricted to the "invasion of interests in the use or enjoy-
ment of land," as opposed to public nuisance, which extends to "virtually any form of
annoyance or inconvenience interfering with common public rights." W. PROSSER, supra
note 23, § 87, at 572. Although only one case has so held, Puritan Holding Co. v.
Holloschitz, 82 Misc. 2d 905, 372 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Sup. Ct. 1975), an abandoned building
probably would interfere with the "use and enjoyment" of nearby property. See Arkansas
Release Guidance Found. v. Needler, 252 Ark. 194, 196, 477 S.W.2d 821, 822 (1972)
(halfway house enjoined as a private nuisance because convicts it brought to neighbor-
hood caused nearby residents "real and reasonable fear ... for their safety" and thereby
diminished property values); Keenly v. McCarty, 13 Misc. 524, 244 N.Y.S. 63 (Sup. Ct.
1930) (asylum for alcoholics, drug addicts, and insane located in residential neighborhood,
restricted to acceptance of non-obtrusive occupants because patients' conduct disturbed
neighbors); W. PROSSER, supra note 23, § 89, at 590-93. But see 58 AM. JUR. 2d Nuisances
§ 74t (1971).
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the social utility of the defendant's conduct.2 7 Since abandonment has
little social utility, a relatively small amount of harm to the neighbors
should justify relief.28
In some states, neighbors suffering "substantial harm" from a
nuisance can obtain an injunction ordering its abatement.20 Courts
in other states grant an injunction only when defendants' costs of
compliance are less than the damages suffered by plaintiffs.30 If in-
junctive relief is granted, damages are awarded only for harm suffered
during existence of the nuisance. 31 If an injunction is denied, neigh-
27. W. PROSSER, supra note 23, § 87, at 580-82; REfsTATEMENT, supra note 23, §§ 822(a),
826.
28. Some commentators have suggested that this balancing test be used not to
determine whether .to award damages, but only to decide whether an injunction is
appropriate. RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, at 31-32 (proposals by Professors James and
Keeton for § 822); Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CFn. L. REV. 681, 720-21 (1973).
29. E.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 223, 257 N.E.2d 870, 872,
309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 315 (1970); Theatre Estates, Inc. v. Village, 462 P.2d 651, 653 (Okla.
1970); 5 R. POWELL, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 707, at 344.3-.4 (1975).
Demolition of an abandoned building is the most effective and equitable means of
abating the nuisance. Sealing the building, a requirement in some cities, does not reduce
significantly the harmful effects of abandonment. See note 21 supra. Ordering an owner
to continue in operation at a loss might be characterized as a taking without just com-
pensation and therefore a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
Although demolition substantially reduces harmful externalities, it does not extinguish
the owner's responsibility for the property. The remaining vacant lot could become a
dumping ground for garbage and, consequently, a health hazard and nuisance to nearby
residents. See Dexter v. Bebenek, 458 Pa. 1, 327 A.2d 38 (1974). The additional burden on
the owner-to police the property even after demolition-seems somewhat unfair, since
he probably cannot sell the land. Nevertheless, nearby residents have a right to protection
from such interference with the use and enjoyment of their property. One solution
would be to allow an owner forced to demolish his building to quitclaim his lot to the
local government, which would police it as part of its general sanitation operations.
The minimal cost involved thus would be spread among all taxpayers.
30. It has been proposed that the balancing test be cast in broader terms-weighing
the social costs of compliance against the harm alleviated. See Ellickson, supra note
28, at 720. This test mandates consideration of such costs as the loss of jobs if a pollut-
ing factory is closed. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870,
309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970). However, since demolition of an abandoned building should
involve insignificant social costs, only the defendant's costs of compliance need be
weighed in the balance.
The states are almost equally divided between those that use a balancing test and
those that do not. 5 R. POWELL, supra note 29, 707, at 344.3-.4. Commentators have
favored the balancing test as a means of preventing economic waste. Id. at 344.5. Sec
Ellickson, supra note 28, at 720.
31. E.g., Spaulding v. Cameron, 38 Cal. 2d 265, 270, 239 P.2d 625, 629 (1952); Shearing
v. City of Rochester, 51 Misc. 2d 436, 440-41, 273 N.Y.S.2d 464, 468-69 (Sdp. Ct. 1966).
Cognizable harms suffered during existence of the nuisance include the reduced rental
value of nearby property as well as any resulting annoyance or physical discomfort to
residents. See, e.g., Acadia, Cal., Ltd. v. Herbert, 54 Cal. 2d. 328, 337, 353 P.2d 294, 299, 5
Cal. Rptr. 686, 691 (1960) (damages for discomfort and suffering); Krulikowski v. Poly.
cost Corp., 153 Conn. 661, 670, 220 A.2d 444, 449 (1966); Mandell v. Pasquaretto, 76
Misc. 2d 405, 410, 350 N.Y.S.2d 561, 567 (Sup. Ct. 1973); 58 AN.s. JuR. 2d Nuisances §§ 122,
124 (1971).
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bors can recover for the permanent injury to their property,32 mea-
sured by the decline in its market value.33 Plaintiffs who do not seek
an injunction are limited to damages for retrospective harm if the
nuisance can be abated.3 4 Where the nuisance cannot be eliminated,
permanent damages are appropriate.35
More extensive use of nuisance law3" would provide neighbors with
protection not dependent on local government initiative. But pres-
ently, the substantial harm requirement and the balancing tests often
may prevent plaintiffs from obtaining relief until an abandoned build-
ing is generating substantial externalities. 37 Moreover, many such
buildings are not currently considered nuisances.3s
Accordingly, to facilitate and encourage resort to the nuisance
remedy, courts should treat abandoned buildings as nuisances per se.
Proof of abandonment3 9 would leave only the question of remedy to
32. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 226-27, 257 N.E.2d 870, 874,
309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 318 (1970); 5 R. POWELL, supra note 29, ff 706, at 338 & n.22.
33. 5 R. POWELL, supra note 29, 707, at 344.9; e.g., Kinley v. Atlantic Cement Co.,
42 App. Div. 2d 496, 498, 349 N.Y.S.2d 199, 201 (1973).
34. See, e.g., Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 45 Cal. 2d 265, 268-69, 288 P.2d
507, 509 (1955); Spaulding v. Cameron, 38 Cal. 2d 265, 267-70, 239 P.2d 625, 627-29
(1952); Miller v. Town of Ankeny, 253 Iowa 1055, 1062, 114 NAV.2d 910, 914 (1962);
Pettingill v. Turo, 159 Me. 350, 357, 193 A.2d 367, 372 (1963). But see Puritan Holding
Co. v. Holloschitz, 82 Misc. 2d 905, 372 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (court awarded
permanent damages without considering whether nuisance could be abated).
35. See, e.g., Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 45 Cal. 2d 265, 268-69, 288 P.2d 507,
509 (1955); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 226, 257 N.E.2d 870, 874, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312, 318 (1970).
36. See note 4 supra.
37. These threshold requirements frustrate efforts to remove abandoned buildings
before exvpectations about the neighborhood's future decline. Also, the threshold require-
ments add to the evidentiary burden on the plaintiffs, increasing their costs of litigation
and thus deterring nuisance suits.
38. Even if an abandoned building is not a health, fire, or safety hazard, it still may
inflict aesthetic injuries on the community. See note 18 supra. Courts have been re-
luctant to predicate nuisance liability on such harms. See, e.g., People v. Oliver, 86 Cal.
App. 2d 885, 887-88, 195 P.2d 926, 928 (1948); Mahlstadt v. City of Indianola, 251 Iowa
222, 232, 100 N.W.2d 189, 195 (1959); Cahill v. Heckel, 87 N.J. Super. 201, 204, 208 A.2d
651, 652 (1965). But see University Gardens Property Owners' Ass'n v. University Gardens
Corp., 21 Misc. 2d 243, 189 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. 1959), afl'd, 10 App. Div. 2d 993, 203
N.Y.S.2d 250 (1960); Brown v. Arbuckle, 88 Cal. App. 2d 258, 263, 198 P.2d 550, 553
(1948) (funeral homes in residential areas held private nuisances because they create
constant awareness of death). Nor will courts impose nuisance liability for an activity
simply because it depresses property values. See, e.g., Taliaferro v. Salyer, 162 Cal. App.
2d 685, 691, 328 P.2d 799, 802 (1958); Township of Garfield v. Young, 348 Mich. 337,
343-44, 82 N.W.2d 876, 879 (1957). Aesthetic costs which depress property values are as
tangible as costs imposed by other kinds of nuisances. They should therefore be com-
pensable. Ellickson, supra note 28, at 734-35. See Noel, Unaesthetic Sights as Nuisances,
25 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1939); Note, Aesthetic Nuisance: An Emerging Cause of Action, 45
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1075 (1970).
39. A building should be considered abandoned once it has been vacant for a period
determined by the courts or legislature. Where a few tenants remain in a building
nearly vacant, it should be presumed abandoned. An owner may rebut that presumption
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be litigated. In transitional areas, 40 the externalities of abandonment
should be presumed to outweigh the costs of demolition. Such a
presumption would alleviate the evidentiary burden on the neighbors
and would allow them to obtain injunctive relief before the building
caused substantial harm. 41 In other areas, damages from abandonment
would be less severe, depriving neighbors of the benefit of the pre-
sumption. Injunctive relief thus would be less readily available; the
plaintiffs would have to prove their damages. However, once the per
se rule resolved the issue of liability, the parties would have an incen-
tive to settle in order to avoid incurring substantial litigation costs. In
either transitional or deteriorated neighborhoods, the per se rule
would bring all abandoned buildings generating externalities within
the reach of nuisance law.
III. Limitations of the Nuisance Approach
Three factors may limit the effectiveness of the nuisance approach.
First, many abandoning owners cannot be forced to satisfy nuisance
judgments. Second, where judgments are enforceable, damages may be
difficult to measure. Finally, the costs of litigation may outweigh the
benefits of reducing the externalities of abandonment.
The nuisance remedy will be a hollow one if owners cannot be
compelled to satisfy judgments. Little is known about the characteristics
of abandoning owners; many of them may be judgment-proof. How-
ever, it is reasonable to assume that a substantial number of in-
by showing that he has continued to collect rent, provide essential services, and seek
additional tenants. For other definitions of abandonment, see N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS
LAW § 1971 (McKinney Supp. 1975); J. HurHrs & K. BLEAKLY, supra note 3, at 213-36.
See also STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 274-79.
40. In defining a transitional area, the court could employ statutory criteria used in
urban rehabilitation programs. See note 3 supra. But to forestall extended litigation over
whether a neighborhood is transitional, courts should accept as conclusive any legisla-
tive delineations of such areas.
41. In transitional areas, the harm caused by abandonment is likely to be far-reaching
and significant. See notes 2 & 19 supra. In Puritan Holding Co. v. Holloschitz, 82 Misc.
2d 905, 372 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Sup. Ct. 1975), for example, the owner of an apartment build-
ing across the street from an abandoned building recovered $30,000 for the decline in
the value of his property caused by the abandonment. By comparison, the costs of
demolition are not high. In 1972, to leiel a two-story, wooden frame building in Newark
cost between $1,000 and $2,000. STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 231. Demolition of a brick
structure is more expensive. See City of Chicago v. General Realty Corp., 133 Ill. App.
2d 662, 666, 273 N.E.2d 712, 715 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 945 (1972) (cost of demolish-
ing three-story brick building containing 23 apartment units and five stores was S7,963). If
tenants continue to live in the building after the owner has abandoned, he must evict
them before he can demolish the building. Eviction also may involve legal and social
costs. See Robinson v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (land-
lord's efforts to take building off rental market frustrated for over three years by
non-rent-paying tenant).
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dividuals owning abandoned buildings have resources sufficient to
cover nuisance judgments. 42 Even when owners are judgment-proof,
courts may grant liens on the abandoned property to satisfy some
portion of the judgment. 43
There are further difficulties in recovering judgments if abandoned
buildings are owned by close corporations with few assets. 44 Stock-
holders of these corporations generally are shielded from tort liability.4 5
As successful nuisance actions are brought, more owners may take
refuge behind the corporate form. Yet courts do have equitable power
to "pierce the corporate veil" in order to hold stockholders personally
liable for the actions of their corporation.46 There are strong argu-
42. Sternlieb's study of Newark is the only in-depth inquiry into the characteristics of
abandoning owners. A sample of 567 buildings initially surveyed in 1964 was reexamined
in 1972 in order to identify the factors causing abandonment. STERNLIEB, supra note 1,
at xiv. Of owners who had abandoned by 1972, 20.3% had annual incomes in 1964
exceeding .20,000; 30.5% earned between $8,000 and $20,000 a year. Id. at 312. In ad-
dition, 74.6% owned other property, id. at 305, which probably could be applied toward
satisfaction of a damage judgment. On the other hand, 23.8% earned between $3,000
and $5,000, and 11.9% earned less than .$3,000 a year. Id. at 312. Since tternlieb's study
focused primarily on slums, his figures may be low in comparison to those for transi-
tional areas. Further, his figures apply only to Newark, and Sternlieb concedes they may
not be trustworthy. Id. But if the costs of demolition range from S1,000 to $10,000, see
note 41 supra, Sternlieb's figures would suggest that a substantial percentage of owners
could comply with an injunction, the primary objective in a nuisance action.
Owners with ample resources to satisfy judgments may attempt to escape liability by
transferring title to a judgment-proof individual. For example, to avoid fines for build-
ing code violations, owners in New York have reportedly transferred title to vagrants in
the Bowery, paying them a fee for their services. House Papers, supra note 1, at 325.
Such tactics, however, may not enable an owner to evade responsibility for an abandoned
building, because liability for a nuisance is not discharged by transfer of title. See N.Y.
REAL PR oP. AcI-ONs LAW § 841 (McKinney 1963) ("person by whom the nuisance has been
erected and a person to whom the property has been transferred may be joined as de-
fendants" in nuisance action); State v. Ole Olsen, Ltd., 38 App. Div. 2d 967, 968, 331
N.Y.S.2d 761, 763 (1972), modified, 35 N.Y.2d 979, 324 N.E.2d 886, 365 N.Y.S.2d 528
(1975). See also O'Connor v. Altus, 123 N.J. Super. 379, 384-85, 303 A.2d 329, 331 (1973),
modified, 67 N.J. 106, 335 A.2d 545 (1975). But see Maisenbach v. Buckner, 133 Ill. App.
2d 53, 272 N.E.2d 851 (1971).
43. Cities take similar liens under demolition and receivership programs. See note 20
supra. However, abandoned property generally will not be very valuable. Exceptions may
be found in transitional areas or in cases in which the abandoning owner for some reason
was unable to realize the economic potential of his property. Cf. note 12 supra.
44. See Note, Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable for the Torts of Their
Corporations? 76 YALE L.J. 1190, 1191-92 & n.10 (1967). For general statistics on ownership
of slum housing, see GRICSBY, supra note 1, at 161; STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 56; Acker-
man, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes,
Housing Subsidies, and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093, 1099 n.7 (1971).
45. The law permits incorporation of a business for the very purpose of enabling its
owners to escape personal liability. E.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 417, 223
N.E.2d 6, 7, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585, 587 (1966); Elenkrieg v. Siebrecht, 238 N.Y. 254, 262, 144
N.E. 519, 521 (1924); H. HENN, LAW OF CorPoUrTIoNs § 146 (2d ed. 1970).
46. Courts agree that they have the power to pierce the corporate veil to achieve
equity, but they vary in their willingness to invoke this power. Compare Bangor Punta
Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & A.R.R., 417 U.S. 703, 713 (1974) and Swanson v. Levy, 509
F.2d 859, 861-62 (9th Cir. 1975) with Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 1967),
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ments for using this power to reach owners of abandoned buildings.
Arguably, the liability was foreseeable; the corporation should have
maintained adequate capital to satisfy adverse judgments. 47 Moreover,
disregarding the corporate structure would promote a public policy
of recognized importance 4S-the preservation of the urban environ-
ment.49 If courts choose not to rely on equitable doctrine, they still
may ignore the corporate structure if there has not been strict com-
pliance with corporate formalities."°
Governmental agencies may also own abandoned buildings. The
Federal Housing Authority (FHA) may take title to abandoned build.
ings when owners default on mortgage payments.51 City governments
may take title when property taxes are in arrears. 52 The city or the
FHA thereby assumes responsibility to abate the nuisance; either may
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988 (1968) and Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d
6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966). See H. HENN, supra note 45, §§ 146-147. There is, however, a
growing tendency for courts to disregard the corporate fiction. I W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDLA
OF THE LAW OF&PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41, at 166 (1974); F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CoRoRATroNs
§ 1.09a, at 34 (1971).
47. Where a corporation has neither adequate capital nor insurance to provide for
risks of loss foreseeable in its line of business, the corporate form often is disregarded.
See Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576,
364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961) (dictum). But see Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18
N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966).
48. See Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & A.R.R., 417 U.S. 703, 713 (1974)
("corporate form may be disregarded in the interests of justice where it is used to defeat
an overriding public policy"); see, e.g., Capital Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 734, 737 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (corporate veil pierced to promote fair and efficient distribution of radio
service).
49. In 1973, the New York legislature concluded that the abandonment problem was
a "public emergency," and found that abandoned buildings "are hazardous to human
life, health, safety and morals, have a deleterious effect on the community as a living
environment, and attract vandals and other criminals." N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS LAW
§ 1970 (McKinney Supp. 1975) (legislative findings). Accordingly, the legislature has
denied the protection of the corporate form to major stockholders of corporations own-
ing multiple dwellings that are declared nuisances. N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. LAW § 304.8
(McKinney 1974). See also Kurtigian v. City of Worcester, 348 Mass. 284, 291, 203 N.E.2d
692, 696 (1965) (city held liable for private nuisance; public policy required that some-
one be responsible for nuisances on urban property).
50. Courts have disregarded the corporate form where there is such a unity of interest
and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no
longer exist. See, e.g., Segan Constr. Corp. v. Nor-West Builders, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 691,
698-99 (D. Conn. 1967); 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 46, § 41.1, at 171. The factors ex-
amined include whether stock was issued, whether other legal formalities were followed,
and whether corporate and personal finances were segregated. Von Brimer v. Whirlpool
Corp., 362 F. Supp. 1182, 1194 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
51. The Department of Housing and Urban Development through the FHA has
become the unwilling owner of about 100,000 abandoned housing units. N.Y. Times,
Dec. 11, 1975, at I, col. 7. For a description of the deficiencies of the HUD mortgage
guarantee programs that lead to FHA acquisitions, see Comment, supra note 14, at 858-59.
52. In 1972, New York City held 2,000 abandoned residential buildings obtained,
through tax foreclosure. N.Y. Times, May 2, 1972, at 18, col. 4.
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be liable for damages if it neglects to do so.53 Although recovery of
those damages in some jurisdictions might be barred by the defense of
sovereign immunity, most states do permit nuisance actions against
cities,54 and claims against the FHA might be permitted under the
Federal Tort Claims Act.,
A second problem with the nuisance approach involves proof and
measurement of damages to property.56 If an injunction were granted,
damages would be awarded for the reduced rental value of neighbors'
property during the existence of the nuisance and for any physical
injuries sustained, such as fire loss. 57 Damages for physical injuries
should be easily ascertainable, and any reduction in rental value would
be reflected in the lower rental rates actually charged.58 If the neigh-
bors did not obtain injunctive relief, damages would be awarded for
the permanent depreciation in the market value of their property.59
53. A transferee of real property upon which there exists a nuisance created by his
predecessors in title is liable if he knowingly maintains the nuisance or permits its
continuation. 58 AMi. JUR. 2d Nuisances § 51 (1971). Some states have abolished the
scienter requirement by statute, holding the transferee liable on the same basis as the
creator of the nuisance. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTiONs LAW § 841 (McKinney 1963).
A scienter requirement is not a significant limitation in the case of a transfer of an
abandoned building, because the nature of the nuisance should be apparent to the
transferee.
54. Although some jurisdictions have declined to hold city agencies liable in tort for
actions performed in a "governmental" capacity, e.g., Wickman v. Housing Auth., 196 Ore.
100, 247 P.2d 630 (1952), the "overwhelming weight of authority [indicates that] local
governments creating or maintaining nuisances are liable in tort, regardless of whether
the activity resulting in harm is characterized as 'proprietary' or 'governmental.'" 1A C.
ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAI. CORPORATION LAW § 11.08, at 11-18 (1974). See, e.g., Kurtigian v. City
of Worcester, 348 Mass. 284, 287-88, 203 N.E.2d 692, 694 (1965).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970). See also Note, supra note 12, at 586 (suggesting that
where government land planning decisions negligently create nuisances, suits under
Federal Tort Claims Act should be allowed).
56., A related problem, susceptible to traditional tort law analysis, is the apportion-
ment of damages among a number of abandoning owners. To illustrate, B abandons
his building, claiming that he would not have done so but for the harmful external
effects generated by his neighbor A's abandonment one month earlier. C suffers a decline
in the value of his property and sues both A and B for maintaining nuisances. A would
be liable for B's loss. His liability probably would be measured by the present value
of the rental income of B's property over its expected lifetime. If B were on the verge of
abandonment before A abandoned, then that expected lifetime would be rather short
and damages insubstantial. A and B would be liable for their proportionate shares of
damages due C. If damages suffered by G cannot be divided between the two tortfeasors,
both will be jointly and severally liable for the entire amount. See, e.g., Schindler v.
Standard Oil Co., 166 Ohio 391, 394, 143 N.E.2d 133, 136 (1957); W. PROSSER, supra note
23, § 52.
57, See note 31 supra.
58. A more difficult evidentiary problem would arise if neighbors suffered damages
in the form of foregone rent increases. But an abandonment in the neighborhood would
normally suggest that rents there were not increasing. See also note 7 supra.
59. See pp. 1136-37 & notes 32-33 supra. Even if the neighbor cannot sustain the
burden of proving that the abandoned building has adversely affected property values,
lie still is entitled to damages for personal annoyance and discomfort. See note 31 supra.
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In areas characterized by decreasing property values, it may be difficult
to segregate that part of the decline in value due to the abandoned
building. Yet courts and juries often must assign values where no clear
market standard is available-for example, in assessing damages for
pain and suffering. Thus, although the damage questions are difficult,
they are not uniquely so.
A third objection to encouraging nuisance actions is the high cost of
resolving disputes in the courts. Where the damage caused by an
abandoned building is slight, the costs of a nuisance action to the
parties and to the court system may outweigh the benefits accruing to
the neighbors as a result of the elimination of externalities.00 Legal
expenses, however, are likely to deter many plaintiffs from bringing
actions where damages are inconsequential.6 ' Moreover, the overall
social costs of nuisance litigation may be exaggerated. The per se rule
should simplify the issues at trial .0 2 In addition, once the question of
injunctive relief has been resolved, the amount of damages at stake
often may not merit the costs of further litigation. The parties thus
would have an incentive to settle. Legal expenses also are likely to
induce neighbors to consolidate their claims into a single action,
resulting in a substantial savings in total litigation costs. 3 To reduce
costs further, jurisdiction over nuisance actions could be vested in
courts adapted or created to hear them.64
60. See Ellickson, supra note 28, at 737.
61. Put simply, a rational neighbor would pursue a claim if the expected costs of
litigation were less than his expected benefits discounted by the perceived probability of
success. The neighbor, however, would not consider the costs his suit imposes upon the
abandoning owner or on the judicial system. Id. It thus is possible that suits might be
brought seeking damages less than the total cost of adjudicating the claim. On the
other hand, the neighbor also may not consider benefits accruing to society from the
reduction of the harmful effects of abandonment. Benefits such as the reduced burden
on fire departments and the increased safety of people using the streets may offset the
excess costs.
62. See pp. 1137-38 supra.
63. Rules of joinder should permit such consolidation. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 20;
CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 378 (West 1973); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 1002 (McKinney 1963). A
nuisance suit also may be brought by a neighborhood association in the name of its
members. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.2; CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 388 (West 1973); N.Y.
GEN. Ass'Ns LAW § 12 (McKinney 1942). For an account of an active neighborhood as-
sociation attempting to combat the harmful effects of abandoned buildings, see New
Haven Advocate, Feb. 25, 1976, at 2, col. 1 (on file with Yale Law Journal). Courts have
been reluctant to allow nuisance suits to be brought as class actions because of dif-
ferences among class members in property owned and damages suffered. City of San
Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 447, 460-65, 525 P.2d 701, 710-13, 115 Cal. Rptr. 797,
806-09 (1974); Nowack v. Department of Audit & Control, 72 Misc. 2d 518, 519, 338
N.Y.S.2d 52, 53-54 (Sup. Ct. 1973). But see Foster v. City of Detroit, 405 F.2d 138, 146
(6th Cir. 1968) (common questions of law and fact override differences in damages
suffered by each individual plaintiff).
64. One commentator has suggested that "nuisance boards" be established to handle
nuisance litigation. Such boards would be authorized to award injunctions and damages.
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IV. Economic Implications of the Nuisance Approach
A. Efficiency Considerations
Imposition of liability on the abandoning owner would promote
efficiency in the housing market. 65 Presently, the owner of a building
can abandon "for free"; he assumes no liability for the costs that the
abandonment imposes on others. Therefore, the profit-maximizing
owner weighs only his own costs and benefits in deciding whether to
abandon, rather than also considering the resource cost to society. He
does not undertake measures to mitigate the harmful externalities of
the abandoned building to the point where further mitigation entails
more social costs than social benefits. The nuisance approach would
force the abandoning owner to bear these external costs of his actions,
thereby leading to a reduction in the rate of abandonment and in its
harmful effects."0
They also could appoint special officers to investigate situations and recommend ap-
propriate relief. Ellickson, supra note 28, at 762-66. In New York, nuisance actions could
be handled by the city's Housing Part, a court specializing in housing code violations.
See Rutzick & Huffman, The New York City Housing Court: Trial and Error in Housing
Code Enforcement, 50 N.Y.U. L. Rrv. 738, 749-52 (1975); Note, The New York City
Housing Part: New Remedy for an Old Dilemma, 3 FORDHAM URE. L.J. 267 (1975).
65. A policy promotes efficiency if it reduces the social costs of achieving a given
quality and quantity of housing. Cf. Ellickson, supra note 28, at 688 ("A measure is in-
efficient if it is likely to waste resources .... )
66. Another method of accomplishing this goal is to fine the owner of an abandoned
building that is inflicting substantial harm on the neighborhood. The owner would
spend a sum up to the amount of the fine to reduce externalities. However, the nuisance
approach has three advantages over a system of fines. First, it is probable that a system
of fines, like other anti-abandonment programs, would not be aggressively enforced. See
note 21 supra. Unless the fine imposed were very large, random enforcement would be
an inconsequential deterrent to the abandoning owners. Second, fines would not com-
pensate injured neighbors for their losses. As long as neighbors continued to bear the
risk of loss from abandonment, they would be deterred from maintaining or rehabilitating
their properties. Third, reduction of externalities under a system of uniform fines
would bear no relationship to the harm suffered by the neighbors, but would depend
simply on the relation between the cost of demolition and the size of the fine. Assume
the fine were set at $6,000 and the cost of demolition were S5,000. An abandoning owner
who would cause only S2,000 damage would demolish the building to avoid paying the
fine. As a result, the costs of reducing the externalities would exceed the benefits to
neighbors from the reduction. Under the nuisance approach, an injunction ordering
demolition would not be granted in this situation. Rather, permanent damages of $2,000
would be awarded. See pp. 1136-37 supra. Of course, if the fine were always set below the
cost of demolition, "inefficient" demolition would not occur. But the abandoning owner
then would have no incentive to demolish his building even in situations where it would
be desirable. He would choose instead to pay the fine. Neighbors thus would not be
protected from abandonment unless the city itself demolished the building-in effect,
subsidizing the owner by an amount equal to the difference between the cost of demoli-
tion and the fine.
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In a world where transaction costs, 7 are zero, net social benefits s
would be maximized regardless of who bore the burden of reducing
externalities. If the abandoning owner were not liable for these ex-
ternal effects, the neighbors would band together and pay him to
reduce externalities until the costs of reducing them further out-
weighed the incremental benefit to the neighbors. In this "friction-
less" world either placing liability on the owner or allowing the costs
to fall on the neighbors would produce an efficient outcome.""
But there are, in fact, significant transaction costs. Therefore, to
67. Transaction costs have been defined as those costs "which inhibit competitive
markets from working." Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product:
A Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1655, 1667
(1974). Implicit in the notion of zero transaction costs are the assumptions that the
parties to the bargain have perfect information and that they can enter into an agree-
ment without cost. Id.
68. The social cost of abandonment may consist of more than harm to the immediate
neighbors. See note 61 supra. For any isolated abandonment, however, it is reasonable
to assume that these additional social costs would be insubstantial.
69. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & ECON. 1, 8 (1960). See also
Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation, and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11
J. LAw & ECON. 67 (1968); Demsetz, lWhen Does the Rule of Liability Matter, I J. LEGAL
STUD. 13 (1972). The dynamics of the situation where the neighbors have a legal remedy
against the owner also can be simply described. If the costs of eliminating the harmful
effects of an abandoned building are less than the losses suffered by the neighbors, the
owner will reduce the externalities himself rather than pay damages to the neighbors.
On the other hand, where the costs of eliminating the harmful external effects exceed
the losses suffered by the neighborhood, externalities would not be reduced. The owner,
if liable for damages, would pay the neighbors rather than spend more money to correct
the condition of the building.
If each neighbor's sensitivity to the external effects of abandonment varied with
changes in his income level, the actual quantity of externalities reduced through bar-
gaining would depend on whether the abandoning owner were liable for damages. See
Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. Rev. 1089, 1095-96 & n.14 (1972).
It is necessary at this point, as it is in every discussion of economic efficiency, to
acknowledge the challenge posed by the "theory of the second best." See F. ScHRR,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 22-27 (1970); D. WINCH,
ANALYTICAL WELFARE ECONOMICS 110-16 (1971); see also R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF THE LAW 112-13 (1972) (simple exposition of a second-best problem). By placing
nuisance liability on the abandoning owner, one is trying to force the "price" of
abandonment to reflect fully the costs of that activity-a necessary condition for optimal
resource allocation. But if the conditions for optimal resource allocation are not ful-
filled in all markets in the economy, the theory of the second best states that a mole-
ment to what would be optimal conditions in one market, if resources .were allocated
optimally throughout the economy, may not, in fact, promote economic efficiency in the
economy at large. This Note will not attempt an analytic articulation of the theory of
the second best. Suffice it to say that the principal concern is that movements toward
"more efficient" conditions in one market may have ramifications in other markets which
carry price and output in those markets farther away from conditions necessary for
optimal resource allocation in the economy.
But as analyses in other contexts have noted, it is conventionally assumed that these
second-order effects are minor when changes in small sectors of the economy are in-
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achieve an efficient outcome, liability should be placed on the aban-
doning owner if he can (1) most easily initiate a bargain and (2) most
cheaply reduce the negative externalities." Both conditions appear to
be satisfied. The abandoning owner can most easily initiate the bar-
gaining process because he generally faces lower transaction costs than
his neighbors. Although he must identify and contact the neighbors
likely to be injured, he does not confront the problems of internal
organization that his neighbors must overcome. These problems in-
clude the difficulty of organizing a group of people and reaching a
consensus on bargaining positions." Moreover, the neighbors' efforts
may be undermined by freeloader problems-some individual neigh-
bors may decline to participate in the bargaining process because they
will share in the benefits of the agreement regardless of participation.7 2
The owner can also most cheaply reduce the negative externalities of
the abandoned building. He controls the property where the most
efficient methods of reducing externalities can be employed.73 He also
enjoys certain informational advantages over his neighbors. For ex-
ample, his greater familiarity with the building should give him a
better idea of which method would be most effective. Further, the
neighbors' high organization costs may impede their ability to take
any action.7 4
The nuisance approach thus can eliminate the uncompensated
diminution of nearby property values and reduce the externalities of
abandonment. That reduction, in. turn, should decrease the risk of
rapid deterioration in transitional neighborhoods.75 Since an owner's
decision to repair or upgrade his building depends on the prospects
volved. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 44, at 1110-11 n.22; see also G. CALABRESI, THE
CosTs OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND EcoNOMIc ANALYSIS 87 (1971) (where no "great re-
ordering of the economy is likely as a result . . ., as lawyers or even as political
economists, we can fairly safely assume that such an allocation is beneficial").
70. Professor Calabresi has suggested two criteria for determining who should bear
the costs of external effects in a world with transaction costs: (1) whoever can most
cheaply reduce the costs of these externalities, and (2) where the identity of this in-
dividual is uncertain, whoever faces the lowest transaction costs. Calabresi & Melamed,
supra note 69, at 1096-97. Certainly liability should be placed on a party who meets both
these criteria.
71. See Ellickson, supra note 28, at 725 (suggesting that liability be placed on class
of parties likely to have lowest organization costs-usually class with fewest members).
72. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 69, at 1095 & n.13.
73. There are only three means available to forestall the externalities of abandon-
ment, all of which must be employed on the premises of the abandoning owner. The
building might be sealed, or demolished. See notes 20 & 21 supra. Alternatively, the
owner might continue to operate the building.
74. For example, they may have difficulty reaching agreement on the apportionment
of the costs of any action.
75. See notes 2 & 19 supra.
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for the neighborhood,76 the lower risk should encourage investment in
renovation."
Reduced uncertainty about future conditions would also induce
financial institutions to invest more capital, on more liberal terms, in
urban housing. Investment would be more attractive in housing
markets sufficiently stable to permit long-term predictions about the
viability of neighborhoods.78 An abandoned building may undermine
the stability of a neighborhood and depreciate property values
throughout the area, compromising even viable investments."9 The
nuisance approach would counteract this effect. By reducing the ex-
ternalities of abandonment and improving owner confidence, it would
enhance neighborhood stability. Where an abandoned building did
threaten the value of a mortgaged property, nuisance law would
provide means for a lender to protect its investment.80
B. Distributional Considerations
Frequent resort to the nuisance remedy will bring about a redistri-
bution of resources from abandoning owners to their neighbors.8 1 This
76. STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 64-65.
77. See note 19 supra.
78. See HUD, supra note 1, at 52-53; Duncan, Hood, & Neet, Redlining Practices,
Racial Resegregation, and Urban Decay: Neighborhood Housing Services as a Viable
Alternative, 7 URBAN LAW. 510, 511, 514 (1975); see also Berger, Goldston, & Rothrauff,
Slum Area Rehabilitation by Private Enterprise, 69 CoLuM. L. REv. 739, 750-51 (1969);
Project, supra note 9, at 1198-1200. When financial institutions do invest, they may
demand a substantial risk premium in the form of hefty finance charges, high interest
rates, or short repayment schedules. See Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 830.
Financial institutions do invest in lower income, inner city areas perceived to be
stable. Sternlieb found that in Newark's Ironbound, an ethnic, lower class, inner city
neighborhood, a local savings and loan association had great success with conven-
tional mortgages. The market for housing in Ironbound was vigorous enough to en-
sure both "maintenance of value and regular repairs." STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 246.
See W. NASH, RESIDENTIAL REHABILITATION: PRIVATE PROFITS AND PUBLIC PURPOSES 158-59
(1959) (Chicago lending institutions cooperated in a program to rehabilitate 75-year-old
houses because area residents had a "determined neighborhood spirit").
79. See notes 2 & 19 supra.
80. Potential liability for harms caused by an abandoned building to which they
have taken title might deter financial institutions from investing in urban housing. See
generally N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1975, at 45, col. I (decision holding abandoning owner
liable may discourage responsible people from owning real estate). An institution,
however, may protect itself by lending to financially responsible owners and by requiring
that the owner agree to reimburse the institution for any damages for which it is held
liable. If it becomes evident that the nuisance approach is an impediment to investment
in urban housing, the legislature could temporarily exempt mortgage lenders from
nuisance liability. See, e.g., N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 304.6 (McKinney 1974) (exempting
financial institutions from any civil or criminal liability for maintenance of building as
public nuisance for period of six months after date of foreclosure).
81. Since resident owners are much less apt to abandon than those not in residence,
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redistribution should not prove regressive.82 Further, the nuisance
approach may in effect transfer resources from owners to tenants. This
transfer is a product of the reduction in the rate of abandonment
which should result when liability is imposed on abandoning owners.
Part of the reduction would be attributable to owners who remain in
operation to avoid nuisance liability;8 3 part would be due to elimina-
tion of the "snowballing effects" of abandonment.8 4 As fewer structures
are abandoned, housing which otherwise would have been taken off
the market would remain available for occupation. Assuming demand
does not increase,sa this stability of supply arguably should prevent
the rent increases that otherwise might have ensued. This redistribu-
tion from owners to tenants also should not be regressive."6
see STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 306, they are more likely to be plaintiffs than defendants.
Widespread resort to nuisance actions thus will effect a desirable transfer of resources to
resident owners, who are particularly likely to take care of their properties. See id. at 74;
G. STERNLIEB, THtl TENEMENT LANDLORD 173-76, 228 (1969); Nachbaur, supra note 2, at
18-19.
82. Although some owners may be compelled to pay damages to wealthier neighbors,
there is no reason to believe that abandoning owners as a -class are less well off than
their neighbors. Indeed, Sternlieb's evidence would suggest the opposite conclusion.
STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 312.
83. An owner forced to operate at a loss probably would be unable to recover those
losses by raising rents, even in an area with stable demand. Tenants would not receive
any improvement in housing quality in return for the rent hike. They therefore would
respond to the rent increase by moving to less expensive apartments, especially if
vacancy rates were high. And indeed vacancy rates are likely to be high because of
declining demand for urban housing. See note 7, supra; see also G. STERNLIEB, THE
TENEMENT LANDLORD 88-89, 93 (1969). The owner would be able to raise rents only if
rates in his building initially were lower than those for similar buildings in the area.
8-1. See notes 2 & 19 supra.
85. Such an assumption seems warranted. The nuisance approach is largely prophy-
lactic: deterrence of potential abandonment in an otherwise stable neighborhood is not
a readily perceptible improvement. It thus should not encourage substantial in-migration.
Even if the reduced likelihood of abandonment did perceptibly increase housing quality,
see pp. 1145-46 supra, it still might not be sufficient to overcome the decline in demand
for urban housing. See note 7 supra. Cf. Ackerman, supra note 44, at 1140-43 (arguing
that improved housing quality resulting from strict code enforcement will not induce
in-migration).
86. It is reasonable to assume that owners of urban rental housing are more affluent
than their tenants. Census figures indicate that all tenants in the United States living in
structures built before 1949 had a median income of .$5,700 in 1969. BUREAtU OF THE
CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF HOUSING SUPPLE'MENTARY REPORT: INCOME IN 1969 OF FAMILIES AND
P RIMARY INDIVIDUALS IN OWNER AND RENTER OccUPIED HOusING UNITS FOR THE UNITED
STATLs 4 (Ser. HC (Sl)-10, Oct. 1972). One would expect individual owners to have a
higher income level since they possess income-producing property. Almost half of the
owners in Sternlieb's study held more than one such property. STERNLIEB, supra note 1,
at 60. Further, his evidence, though inexact, seems to suggest that, at least in Newark,
the median income of owners in 1964 was more than $5,700. See id. at 312. Many urban
rental properties, morcover, are owned by corporations, banks, and governmental agencies,
see note 44 supra, a factor that apparently is not reflected in Sternlieb's income statistics.
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Conclusion
Programs dependent on city funding and enforcement do little to
improve confidence in a neighborhood once abandonment strikes. Yet
the potential of nuisance law as an alternative means of controlling the
effects of housing abandonment in transitional areas has not been
exploited. Steps should be taken to facilitate its use. Specifically, this
Note proposes that abandoned buildings be regarded as nuisances per
se and that in transitional areas injunctive relief be presumed appro-
priate. Thus strengthened, the nuisance approach would place an ef-
fective means of redress in the hands of those who suffer most from
building abandonment.
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